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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the twofold nature of the philosophical renunciation of figurative 
language and the feminine. I begin by examining the claims of feminist philosopher 
Phyllis Rooney, who echoes the familiar observation that reason has conventionally been 
linked to masculinity, while unreason has been linked to femininity. Rooney’s innovative 
move is to expose this link by highlighting how the reason/unreason dichotomy has been 
constructed through “sex metaphors” in prominent philosophical works. A “sex 
metaphor” refers to some aspect of a “male-female dynamic,” such as a voyeuristic act, a 
sexual act, or a marriage relationship. Rooney aptly draws upon John Locke’s chapter 
“The Abuse of Words” to illustrate how the use of a sex metaphor can suggest that 
femininity is emblematic of unreason and hence, works to justify the expulsion of 
femininity from philosophy. However, as Rooney later acknowledges, Locke not only 
utilizes a sex metaphor in “The Abuse of Words,” he also genders the linguistic 
mechanism of metaphor itself. Locke’s curious comparison of woman with figurative 
language calls for a thorough analysis of the role of gender in Locke’s semiotic theory. 
What follows is an attempt to expose the chain of association that allows Locke to 
imagine he can connect up metaphor with femininity and expel each from philosophy as 
perpetrators of an “Abuse of Words.” 
 
In Phyllis Rooney’s article “Gendered Reason: Sex Metaphor and Conceptions of 
Reason” she suggests that throughout the history of philosophy, “Reason has regularly 
been portrayed and understood in terms of images and metaphors that involve the 
exclusion or denigration of some element –body, passion, nature, instinct-that is cast as 
‘feminine’” (77). Rooney echoes the familiar feminist observation that reason has 
conventionally been linked to masculinity while unreason has been linked to femininity.1 
Her innovative move is to expose this link by highlighting how the reason/unreason 
dichotomy has been constructed through sex metaphors in prominent philosophical 
works. A “sex metaphor” refers to some aspect of a “male-female dynamic,” such as a 
voyeuristic act, a sexual act, or a marriage relationship (Rooney 78). Enumerating 
                                                 
1 See Genevieve Lloyd’s 1984 publication The Man of Reason: “Male and Female” in Western 
Philosophy. Rooney credits Lloyd’s well-known study on the regular association between reason 
and maleness in the Western philosophical canon (78). 
 passages from Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, Rousseau, Hegel, Kant and Schopenhauer, 
Rooney details how in each a sex metaphor is deployed in the explanation of reason and 
unreason. She proclaims “the pattern is well set in place,” the early uses of sex metaphor 
portray the growth of reason in terms of an extrusion of some aspect that is seen as 
feminine, while the later examples characterize a lapse in reason as involving an explicit 
or implicit intrusion of a feminine element (85).  
Inspired by Rooney’s paper, I wish to take a slightly different direction with my own 
investigation of metaphor and gender in philosophy. Instead of looking at the appearance 
and impact of sex metaphors in philosophical texts, I will discuss how the linguistic 
mechanism of metaphor itself, and figurative language at large, has been cast as an 
inferior and feminine mode of expression in philosophy. Here I do not mean that there is 
something inherently ‘feminine’ revealed in the use of figurative language. Rather, I 
mean that there is an antipathy towards the use of figurative language in philosophy, and 
that antipathy is expressed in sexist terms. What results, I propose, is a twofold 
construction about what philosophy is not: philosophy is not figurative language, and 
philosophy is not feminine.  
A quintessential example of this antipathy can be found in John Locke’s chapter 
entitled “The Abuse of Words” given in Book III of his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. Rooney herself touches upon this chapter in support of her own 
argument, for indeed, Locke does invoke a sex metaphor. But Locke not only makes use 
of a sex metaphor, he claims that figurative language itself is like a woman: 
 
[…]all the art of rhetorick, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and 
figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but 
to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions. And thereby mislead the 
judgment…eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer 
itself ever to be spoken against. And it is vain to find fault with those arts of 
deceiving wherein men find pleasure to be deceived. (Locke 146)  
 
Eleven years later in her essay on Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Philosophy, Language and 
Wizardry,” Rooney revisits this passage, correctly noting that Locke appears to perform a 
dual displacement of women as “other than the ideal or ‘normed’ philosopher subject,” 
and metaphor as “other than the proper language and discourse of philosophy” (32). 
Building upon Rooney’s observation, I subject Locke’s chapter to close analysis in order 
to address the following questions that arise from his strange comparison: how is it that 
something ostensibly gender-neutral, like a form of signification, can be thought of in 
gendered terms? What is the chain of association that allows Locke to connect figurative 
language with femininity? What picture of both figurative language and femininity does 
Locke construct by connecting one to the other? If both figurative language and women 
commit Locke’s “abuse of words,” then is literal language the ‘proper’ mode of 
signification for philosophical discourse, and is that masculine by default?  
 To assist in addressing these questions I draw on the work of American philosopher 
of language Max Black and French feminist philosopher Michèle Le Doeuff. Both 
thinkers note that metaphor, allegory, or any terms considered to invoke image in 
thought, are historically dismissed as ‘ornamental’ in terms of their philosophical 
contribution. Philosophers tend to assume that metaphor can be clarified if it is replaced 
with literal terminology, and consequently, that figurative language is nothing more than 
a diversion from the real substance of a philosophical statement. The metaphor is to 
philosophy as lipstick is upon the mouth, it gives aesthetic pleasure but it is inessential to 
discourse. In the patriarchal imagination this caricature of figurative language slides very 
quickly into an association with femininity. Like figurative language, ‘woman’ can also 
be constructed as mere ornament, as a source of aesthetic pleasure but not a source of 
philosophy. However, just as women are indeed capable of philosophy, so too is 
figurative language significant in philosophical meaning-creation. Black claims that 
metaphors cannot simply be replaced by literal language, and that there is something 
irreducible in their deployment. Le Doeuff contends that imagery is operative in the 
conceptual foundation of prominent philosophical texts. In light of both Black and Le 
Doeuff’s work, I conclude that Locke’s repudiation of figurative language is ill 
considered because it is confused with sexist associations. In other words, his conflation 
of a linguistic mechanism with a sexist stereotype limits the usefulness, and credibility, of 
his semiotic analysis.  
 
1.  Rooney’s article focuses on the use of sex metaphors in the history of philosophy 
to expound the dynamics of reason and unreason. A very clear example of Rooney’s 
project is given in her treatment of Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle 
imagines that the rational part of the soul naturally rules over the irrational part. But, 
Rooney observes, this relationship of domination is explicated in terms of political 
metaphors, the ‘natural’ authority of master over slave or, free man over free woman. 
Specifically, Aristotle writes that 
 
[…] while in the body we see that which moves astray, in the soul we do not. No 
doubt, however, we must none the less suppose that in the soul too there is 
something contrary to the rational principle, resisting and opposing it […] 
Metaphorically and in virtue of a certain resemblance there is a justice, not indeed 
between a man and himself, but between certain parts of him; yet not every kind 
of justice but that of master and servant or that of husband and wife. For these are 
the ratios in which the part of the soul that has a rational principle stands to the 
irrational part. (quoted in Rooney, 81)  
 
Aristotle illustrates his sense of the ‘just’ relationship between the rational and irrational 
parts of the soul by means of such ‘just’ relationships between master and slave or, 
between husband and wife (Rooney 81). This is a clear example of a sex metaphor 
 whereby the dynamics of a heterosexual, patriarchal relationship are called upon to 
illuminate the bifurcation of reason from unreason. The comparison reinforces the notion 
that masculinity is associated with reason, while femininity is associated with unreason, 
and that one ought to rule over the other.  
Rooney moves from her analysis of Aristotle to a series of similar examples found in 
Augustine, Descartes, Rousseau, Hegel, Kant, Locke and Schopenhauer. In each case, she 
highlights an example of sex metaphor and details its connection to the philosophical 
development of reason or unreason. When Rooney turns her attention to Locke, she 
writes: “Of particular interest for my project are examples where woman is cast as the 
other of the knowing subject, or in opposition to such ‘proper’ knowing.” An example 
from Locke’s chapter “The Abuse of Words” in Book III of his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding “illustrates his connection between woman and deception,”  
 
[…]all the art of rhetorick, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and 
figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but 
to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the 
judgment…eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer 
itself ever to be spoken against. And it is vain to find fault with those arts of 
deceiving wherein men find pleasure to be deceived (quoted in Rooney, 84).  
 
Rooney briefly concludes her analysis here by noting Locke’s ironic use of figurative 
language in the very effort to persuade his reader of the deceptive nature of figurative 
language (84).  
But, Rooney is not done with Locke. Eleven years later she revisits his passage in an 
essay about the feminist promise of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. And here it 
becomes clear there is even more to be said about Locke’s semiotic theory. For not only 
does his passage deliver an excellent example of sex metaphor in the history of 
philosophy, it is also a commentary on metaphor itself. Locke’s sex metaphor ‘genders’ 
the mechanism of metaphor, presenting a unique double meaning not given in Rooney’s 
previous examples. Building upon this observation, it is important to ask about the line of 
reasoning that leads Locke to link up “rhetoric,” “the artificial and figurative application 
of words” and “eloquence,” with “the fair sex”? What does Locke’s chain of association 
reveal about how philosophy is imagined as a linguistic enterprise and as a gendered 
enterprise? Let us now turn to “The Abuse of Words” in order to contextualize Locke’s 
curious ‘metaphor about metaphor.’ 
 
2. In his Essay Locke aims to unfold how it is that language can serve philosophical 
knowledge. The key to unlocking the “use and force of Language as subservient to 
instruction and knowledge” he writes, is to consider things like, 
 
 the right use of words; the natural advantages and defects of language; and the 
remedies that ought to be used, to avoid the inconveniences of obscurity or 
uncertainty in the signification of words: without which it is impossible to 
discourse with any clearness or order concerning knowledge (Locke 6).  
 
For Locke, language is ripe with both possibilities and pitfalls for philosophy. His Essay 
is intended to guide thinkers towards the possibilities, while avoiding the pitfalls. What 
we are concerned with here is the status of these so-called pitfalls of language; what 
determines “obscurity” or “uncertainty” for Locke, as opposed to good “clearness or 
order”?   
For Locke there are two general sources of error in language. There are “natural 
imperfections” in language, which present inevitable moments of confusion, and then 
there are avoidable blunders, whereby speakers are simply more confusing than need be: 
 
 Besides the imperfection that is naturally in language and the obscurity and  
 confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are several  
 wilfil faults and neglects which men are guilty of in this way of communication,  
 whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification  
 than naturally need to be (122).  
 
In describing those linguistic errors that are “willed,” Locke adopts a prosecutorial, 
almost moralizing tone. It seems that some people are guilty of intentionally abusing 
language, and his Essay is aimed at correcting those people or at least, pointing out their 
wrongs.  
The first and “most common” of willful abuses Locke outlines is, “the using of words 
without clear and distinct ideas; or, which is worse, signs without anything signified” 
(122). According to Locke, words are signs of ideas, which are themselves signs of 
sensation or internal reflection (Nöth 23). It seems that this abuse happens when a person 
deploys ‘word-signs’ without a clear connection to ‘idea-signs.’ For example, “Wisdom, 
glory and grace” Locke writes, “are words frequent enough in every man’s mouth, 
 
but if a great many of those who use them should be asked what they mean by 
them, they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer: a plain proof, that, 
though they have learned those sounds and have them ready at their tongues ends, 
yet there are no determined ideas laid up in the minds, which are to be expressed 
to others by them (123-124).  
 
Thus according to Locke, many speakers are reckless chatterboxes, simply babbling 
terms without actually knowing how to define the ideas behind them. Prima facie, it is 
not clear that one could speak or write a word without at least invoking the idea behind 
that word. Is it truly possible to replicate language without doing any thinking? However, 
it seems what Locke is essentially denouncing here is the sin of superficiality. We shall 
 see that Locke’s distaste for perceived superficiality is sustained throughout the chapter, 
and links up thematically to his critique of the ornamental use of language.  
Locke identifies six more abuses of language, figurative language is the last of these. 
He describes figurative language as “whitty” and “entertaining” (Locke 146). It stands in 
contrast to “dry truth and real knowledge,” and we use it primarily in discourses where 
we seek “pleasure and delight” over “information and improvement” (Locke 146). Not 
only does figurative language “insinuate the wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby 
mislead the judgment,” it is “certainly in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, 
wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned cannot but be 
thought at a great fault” (Locke 146). Thus for Locke, figurative language is a good 
source of entertainment, pleasure and delight, but it has no part in serious scholarship. 
Hence “men” must be sure to keep figurative language in its place, for it has historically 
tended to creep into formal learning environments, “It is evident how much men love to 
deceive and to be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful instructor of error and deceit, 
has its established professors, is publicly taught, and has always been had in great 
reputation[…]” (Locke 146). It is not clear what history of “great reputation” Locke is 
referring to here, since rhetoric is famously jettisoned by Plato. And yet, whether one 
heeds Plato’s admonitions or not, it seems that according to Locke figurative language 
may always take advantage of those who “love to be deceived.”  
Let us take stock of the inventory of terms Locke has used thus far to describe the 
abuse known as figurative language. The terms are: “entertainment,” “pleasure,” 
“delight,” “misleading,” and “deceptive.” These terms stands against non-figurative 
language, which is described as “dry,” “truthful,” and “real.” The last line in the chapter 
tells us which final terms to add, “Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties 
in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts 
of deceiving, wherein men find pleasure to be deceived (Locke 146). The concluding 
terms are “fair sex” and “men,” to be added to the first and last list respectively. The final 
inventory then, looks like this: 
 
Figurative Language  Non-Figurative Language 
Entertaining   Dry 
Delightful   Truthful 
Pleasurable   Real 
Misleading   Men 
Deceptive 
Fair Sex 
 
Locke has managed to give figurative language a gender and conjure up a sexist 
stereotype, all in one sentence. What connects these two moves? Clearly, Locke imagines 
that the qualities of figurative language similarly describe women, and vice versa. 
Needless to say, the comparison calls upon old yet persistent, sexist notions in the Anglo-
 European world, that women are intended to invoke pleasure, that women are 
preoccupied with superficial artifacts, that women live for appearance but not for 
substance or meaning, and that women are devious. And yet, despite all these unflattering 
descriptors, the very worst implication of Locke’s comparison is that is women are 
deemed analogous to an “abuse of words,” which seems to imply that women ought not 
to talk at all, or perhaps that if they are to talk, they ought to talk like men.  
But, how is one to go about ‘talking like a man’? We can deduce from Locke’s 
passage that to ‘speak like a man,’ one cannot use the language associated with the “fair 
sex.” Thus, to ‘speak like a man,’ one must abandon figurative language entirely and 
communicate without calling upon imagery. According to Locke, literal language may be 
“dry,” but at least it yields “truth,” and “real knowledge.” Thus for Locke, literal 
language, ‘man’s language,’ is the language of philosophy.  
 
3. Locke’s denigration of figurative language is not foreign to the history of 
philosophy. As Black notes, “To draw attention to a philosopher’s metaphors is to belittle 
him-like praising a logician for his beautiful handwriting. Addiction to metaphor is held 
to be illicit, on the principle that whereof one can speak metaphorically, thereof one 
[ought] not to speak at all” (25). Le Doeuff confirms Black’s sentiment, noting that, 
“Whether one looks for a characterization of philosophical discourse to Plato, to Hegel or 
to Bréhier, one always meets with a reference to the rational, the concept, the argued, the 
logical, the abstract” (1). No agnosticism remains about what philosophy is not, Le 
Doeuff continues, philosophy is not a story, a pictorial description, or a work of literature. 
Philosophical discourse is “inscribed and declares its status as philosophy through a break 
with myth, fable, the poetic”—in short, through a break with the domain of the image (Le 
Doeuff 1).  
What is behind this philosophical aversion to figurative language? According to 
Black, the aversion stems in part from the “substitution view of metaphor,” the theory 
that any literal expression can be used in place of a metaphorical one (31). Black claims 
that until recently, most writers “who have had anything to say about metaphor” have 
“accepted one or another form of the substitution view of metaphor” (31). Thus it is not 
just philosophers who assume this view. For example, Black recounts how Richard 
Whately, rhetorician, logician, and author of Elements of Rhetoric published in 1846, 
defined a metaphor as “a word substituted for another on account of resemblance or 
analogy between their significations” (quoted in Black, 31). And in modern times, the 
substitution view persists. Black finds it in the Oxford English Dictionary, “Metaphor: 
The figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object 
different from, but analogous to, that to which is it properly applicable…” (31). 
According to the substitution view of metaphor, the author substitutes metaphorical sign 
M for literal sign L. It becomes the reader’s task to recognize M as metaphor, and to 
mentally switch L for M in order to grasp the full meaning of the sentence. In this sense, 
 “understanding a metaphor is like deciphering a code or unraveling a riddle”(Black 32). 
On this view, it seems as if metaphor is nothing more than a linguistic trick: fancy, but 
unnecessary and potentially confusing. So, why might an author play this kind of game 
with his or her reader? “We are told that the metaphorical expression may (in its literal 
use) refer to a more concrete object than would its literal equivalent; and this is supposed 
to give pleasure to the reader[…]the reader is taken to enjoy problem-solving-or to 
delight in the author’s skill at half-concealing, half-revealing his meaning” (Black 34). 
Thus, it seems as if proponents of the substitution view frame figurative language as a 
kind of written flirtation. Metaphor is a literary tease, aimed at stirring pleasure in the 
reader by leading him or her up the path of playful diversion. Thus ultimately, according 
to the substitution view, “if philosophers have something more important to do than give 
pleasure to their readers, metaphor can have no serious place in philosophical discussion” 
(Black 34).  
Black’s description of the substitution view of metaphor resonates significantly with 
Locke’s description of figurative language. Both approaches cast the use of metaphor as 
ornamental, as a trivial diversion that is intended to induce pleasure but is ultimately 
ancillary to meaning-creation. Interestingly, where Locke’s discussion of pleasure in 
deception is directly linked to his feminization of metaphor, Black’s reference to the 
delight of “half-concealed, half-revealed” meaning tiptoes around outright sexualized 
terms. Indeed, while both Locke’s theory and the substitution view of metaphor call upon 
a group of concepts germane to a sexist stereotype, (“entertaining” “pleasurable,” 
“delightful,” “misleading” and “deceptive”) only Locke makes this connection explicit 
for us.  
Besides this whiff of sexist logic, there is something else controversial about the 
substitution view of metaphor. According to Black, the substitution view is mistaken 
because a metaphor cannot simply be replaced with literal terminology. Rather, “when 
we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported 
by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction” (Black 38). 
This is what Black calls the “interaction view of metaphor,” the theory that each of the 
terms in a metaphor function in tandem to produce a meaningful phrase that is irreducible 
to its literal translation (38).2 For example, Black applies the interaction view to the 
metaphor “the Man is a wolf” (39). The first term “man” obtains a new meaning within 
the metaphor, a meaning that is not apparent in the literal use of the word “man.” This is 
because the second term “wolf” imposes a peculiar kind of meaning upon the first term. 
If “the man is a wolf,” he is ferocious, he is wild, he is a hunter, he is dangerous, 
(possibly he is very hairy) etc. These descriptors are not normally implied by our literal 
uses of the word “man.” When someone says, “a man is at the door” we do not 
immediately conjure up the associations ‘ferocious,’ ‘wild,’ etc., these are ‘wolf specific’ 
                                                 
2 Black credits I.A. Richards and W. Bedell Stanford with the original development of the 
interaction view (see Black, 38). 
 associations. As Black puts it, “Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked 
about in ‘wolf-language’ will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed 
into the background” (41). Thus, the wolf metaphor suppresses some senses of man and 
emphasizes others; the term “wolf” organizes our specific view of “man” in this 
metaphor (Black 41). 
Ultimately, the interaction view tells us that the literal translation of a metaphor is 
impossible because the words in a metaphor are not reducible to simple definitions. A 
metaphor does not compare two singular ideas but rather, the metaphor compares two 
clusters of association, the meaning of which only become narrowed by their mutual 
implication in the metaphor. Thus according to the interaction view, Locke’s semiotic 
theory goes astray in the claim that a ‘word-sign’ has meaning because it is connected to 
a distinct ‘idea-sign,’ for the sense of a word only emerges in reference to the words 
around it. For example, I could use the metaphor, “Eloquence, like the fair sex, is 
expressive, powerful, and effective.” I have entirely altered the picture of woman that 
Locke gave us with his metaphor about eloquence, and yet I have still described 
eloquence using correct synonyms. I can alter the understanding of “eloquence” in this 
sentence, as well as the representation of “woman,” not because a metaphor is somehow 
more “deceptive” than other styles of expression, but because neither word points to an 
entirely singular idea. The sense in which I mean either word, indeed the significance of 
the entire sentence, depends on which clusters of association I choose to highlight in the 
metaphor.  
Le Doeuff’s study of figurative language leads her to a conclusion that supports 
Black’s, but her method of analysis is quite different. Rather than theorizing about the 
meaning immanent to individual metaphors and sentences, Le Doeuff reflects on strands 
of the imaginary as they operate in entire philosophical texts. Le Doeuff proposes to do 
an “iconographic investigation” of certain prominent works in the history of philosophy 
in order to show where figurative language has an essential, if undervalued role (9). In 
her preface she writes that philosophy has always arrogated to itself “the right or task of 
speaking about itself, of having a discourse about its own discourse and its (legitimate or 
other) modes, writing a commentary on its own texts.” This meta-discourse, she 
continues, “regularly affirms the non-philosophical character of thought in images. But 
this attempted exclusion always fails” (6). She finds her first example of this failure in 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his Critique of Practical Reason. She observes that 
in both Critiques there is the running metaphor of an island. For example, in the 
Transcendental Analytic of the first Critique, Kant tells his readers that, 
 
We have now not merely explored the territory of pure understanding, and 
carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured its extent and assigned 
to everything its rightful place. This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itself 
within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth-seductive name!-surrounded by a 
wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion[…](quoted in Le Doeuff, 8)  
 Kant later continues the metaphor: Before we venture on this sea, to explore it 
in all directions and to obtain assurance whether there be any ground for such 
hopes, it will be as well to begin by casting a glance on the map of the island 
which we are about to leave […] (quoted in Le Doeuff 8). 
 
Le Doeuff posits that this island as it appears and reappears in the Critiques, is “the 
emblem of the Kantian enterprise,” in the sense that the image of the island underlies the 
entire critical endeavor of the first Critique. What is this endeavor? To establish the 
conviction that philosophers ought to seek safety and certainty over stormy illusion, and 
that they can best achieve this through an exploration and documentation of the 
understanding. “The promise of the island of the understanding” Le Doeuff writes, “is 
balanced by some terrifying dangers. Its security value is hardly explained, and can be 
grasped only through contrast: the island is a good object only be being excepted from an 
uninhabitable world” (12).  
One might object that Locke wrote before Kant and thus, it is unfair to use Le 
Doeuff’s example to critique Locke’s points about the role of figurative language in 
philosophy. However, one imagines that Locke was at least familiar with the famous 
allegory of the cave in Plato’s Republic, to which Le Doeuff’s point about the Critiques 
may just as well be applied. The allegory of the cave is also the “emblem” of the Platonic 
enterprise, taught in many (if not all) introductory philosophy classes. The allegory is 
taught ubiquitously for a reason, because the image of the cave gives allows students to 
grasp Plato’s metaphysical system in a way that purely literal explanations do not. Hence, 
we can see that Le Doeuff’s thesis is not necessarily limited to the Critiques, and that 
figurative language plays a powerful role in the Republic as well.  
Unlike Black’s exploration of metaphor, Le Doeuff expresses an awareness of the 
dual rejection of both figurative language and femininity in philosophy. She writes that, 
“The images that appear in theoretical texts are normally viewed as extrinsic to the 
theoretical work, so that to interest oneself in them seems like a merely anecdotal 
approach to philosophy[…]It is of course well known that women can only ever look at 
history in terms of little stories” (2). She argues that philosophy is a “masculine 
discourse,” either outright hostile to female thinkers or, recognizing them only insofar as 
they create inferior, “anecdotal” philosophizing (100-101). Anecdotal philosophizing is 
of course, storytelling, which is the province of figurative language.  
Le Doeuff ends up subsuming the dual rejection of figurative language and femininity 
under an analysis of philosophy’s propensity towards exclusion at large. This is not to say 
that paying attention to the dual rejection is unimportant, but simply that figurative 
language and women are only two of many elements that philosophy seems eager to 
expel. “The discourse which we call ‘philosophical,’” Le Doeuff writes,  
 
produces itself through the fact that it represses, excludes and dissolves, or claims 
to dissolve, another discourse, other forms of knowledge…For philosophical 
 discourse is a discipline, that is to say a discourse obeying (or claiming to obey) a 
finite number of rules, procedures or operations, and as such it represents a 
closure, a delimitation which denies the (actually or potentially) indefinite 
character of modes of thought; it is a barrage restraining the number of possible 
(acceptable) statements[…](114).  
 
And what is “repressed, excluded and dissolved”? Indeed, figurative language and 
whatever is considered feminine fall under that category, along with “seductive 
discourse, inconclusive syllogisms, recourse to final causes or occult forms, arguments 
from authority, and so forth” (Le Doeuff 115). But for Le Doeuff, paying too much 
attention to the list of excluded elements risks ignoring the essential dynamic, which is 
simply one of eviction at large. There is something about philosophy itself, she claims, 
that demands the indiscriminate act of expulsion (115). In fact according to Le Doeuff, 
philosophy is created through this act of expulsion, just as a field is created by virtue of 
its fences. Hence, whatever is ejected from philosophy is simultaneously essential to 
philosophy’s creation. “The old wives tales and nannies’ lore are always ‘obscuring’ the 
clear light of the concept” she writes, “not because the repressed in general might be 
overwhelming by nature, but because the finite stock of admissible procedures is never 
sufficient.” Philosophy presupposes an “undefined area, a certain play of structures, a 
certain margin of free-floating around the codified procedures. Thus shadow is in the 
very field of light and woman is an internal enemy” (Le Doeuff 115).  
Thus, like Black, Le Doeuff highlights the contradictory relationship philosophy has 
to figurative language. Formally, philosophy jettisons figurative language, and yet it is 
partially constituted by it, either through the direct utilization of metaphor, (such as in 
Kant’s Critique or Plato’s Republic) or through the self-creative act of expelling 
metaphor. And according to Le Doeuff, whatever is cast as feminine in philosophy is also 
caught up in this stranglehold of simultaneous necessity and repudiation.  
 
4. Locke warns us about the abuse of words in philosophy, but if there really is a 
disciplinary imperative to repudiate, as Le Doeuff claims, then this is the real abuse we 
ought to watch out for. Particularly when the bundles of notions repudiated (the 
ornamental, the superficial, the deceptive) seem to be cross-fertilized with sexist 
stereotypes. Whatever this compulsive disciplinary rejection is, it has been used in the 
service of, or is symptomatic of, an entrenched patriarchal spirit in philosophy. 
Furthermore, this exclusionary move simply leads to an analytic mess. Locke soils the 
credibility of his semiotic analysis, by indefensibly condemning an expressive style 
because he associates it with a particularly derogatory picture of femininity. This is 
simply not a good reason to dismiss figurative language as philosophically “abusive.” 
Locke is thus unconvincing on his own, but in light of Black and Le Doeuff’s work his 
argument seems further unjustified, for both thinkers have demonstrated that despite 
 philosophy’s formal exclusion of figurative language, the latter nonetheless plays a 
significant role in meaning-creation.  
We can conclude from this study that there is, to say the least, a complicated 
relationship between what kind of language counts as “good” or “clear” philosophy, and 
who is articulating that language in what social context. For it is not a coincidence that in 
a historically sexist society women have been associated with the kind of speech that 
Locke tells us does not count as philosophy. This reveals a disturbing snapshot of how 
something that seems like it ought to be utterly gender neutral, like the philosophical 
discussion of signification, can still be informed by sexism. There is a more optimistic 
up-shot of this conclusion however: for, should we begin to question the nature of 
philosophy’s discursive limits, perhaps we can begin to unlock philosophical potential in 
and beyond figurative expression. Not only then, might we become more attentive to the 
philosophical significance of figurative language, but also, perhaps we may begin to 
attend to philosophical richness of the figure itself. Understanding the historical and 
political nature of prohibitions on certain kinds of expression in philosophy can, perhaps, 
help us to embrace radically new modes of philosophical expression rooted in more 
progressive contextual dynamics.  
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